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To be effective, the theme of good governance and human rights (GGHR) in the 
EU-GCC dialogue needs to be addressed in tandem with those of political and 
security cooperation on the wider Gulf and on the Palestine issue. It also should 
be two-way process, where principle is paired with cultural sensitivity (but not 
cultural relativism).  
 
There are differences on GGHR questions across the GCC and within the 
different states themselves, but throughout, there is some local appetite for 
accountability and for a greater voice in the way the countries are run. This can 
only increase as the resources-demands equation shifts further: the projected 
expansion in hydrocarbons production will not fully compensate for the 
population explosion and costs of maintenance, hydrocarbon development, and 
welfare – thus undermining the ‘rentier’ social contract. Globalisation will only 
add to this, both by pushing for further economic reform and by bringing in new 
political ideas. The growing size and complexity of these societies also means 
that traditional channels for airing grievances, and traditional bases of 
legitimacy, are decreasingly able, by themselves, to assure popular 
acquiescence. Consequently, the case for gradual further political evolution in 
the GCC is a practical necessity both for the EU and the GCC regimes.  
 
Apart from the political order, the GCC states feature other significant 
human rights problems, although the level varies. Even the worst case, Saudi 
Arabia, remains in most respects a regime of benevolent if autocratic family 
rule. Moreover, many of the human rights problems stem from conservative 
patriarchal social values rather than from government abuse. Nevertheless, both 
for reasons of principle and established EU policy, and for practical reasons 
similar to those advanced for political reform, there is a strong case for 
addressing this issue in the EU-GCC dialogue.  
 
Neither in the political realm nor in that of other human rights, should 
‘Islam’ be seen as an obstacle:  only particular politically or socially determined 
interpretations of religious rules can be seen as such. Attempts to persuade such 
societies away from the Sharia are futile and misguided. But matters of 
interpretation and implementation, judicial systems and training, and policing, 
can fruitfully be addressed in exchanges of views at the non-governmental as 
well as the governmental level. Facilitating internal debate – tapping into 
already existing developments and thinking within Gulf and Muslim societies – 
through indirect as well as direct means, decentralised as well as government-to-
government, and using persuasion rather than pressure, is likely to have the 
greatest effect. One specific model would be that of the European Initiative for 
Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), whose focus on working directly with civil society, largely through NGOs but also through collaboration with UN and 
other international agencies, makes it particularly suitable. The EU should not, 
however, be shy of proclaiming its own principles; nor is there any reason why 
international agreements that have been ratified by these states themselves 
cannot be used as points of reference, and encouraging further such signatures: 
once in place, such agreements also become a possible point of reference for the 
local civil society. 
 
European actors must not think in exclusively collective nor bilateral 
terms: bloc-to-bloc initiatives should be combined with bloc-to-state ones, as 
well as state-to-state approaches, depending on what is most effective in any 
given case. This makes it crucial that communication between EU organs and 
national governments is improved at the relevant levels, not least to make sure 
that agreed EU strategies are actually known and acted upon by national 
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
That EU-GCC relations have been hampered to some extent by an 
underdeveloped political dialogue, is perhaps a truism. There are, indeed, 
several weak spots in the relationship, both at the official and the societal level, 
relating to cultural (mis)understanding as well as political issues – the two 
usually intertwined, and both of them concerning domestic as well as 
international themes. In other words, just as domestic politics, political culture, 
and foreign policy are tightly interconnected in the Gulf, so are perceptions of 
outside actors’ interventions or initiatives on any of these issues. Consequently, 
for instance, debates or dialogue on good governance and human rights 
(henceforth: GGHR), must be seen and treated as a part of this complex:  both 
because they often intrinsically are, and because addressing them as such is 
likely to gain greater acceptance than has usually been the case.  
 
This paper, therefore, should be seen as one panel of a triptych covering 
the broad theme of ‘Political Dialogue’, perhaps better labelled ‘political and 
security cooperation’. There are three main aspects, or subjects, to this dialogue,  
taking into account the main priorities of Gulf and European governments: (1) 
the Arab-Israeli dispute and the ‘peace process’; (2) Gulf security; and (3) 
‘governance’.  Here we deal with the third subject in particular. A separate paper 
will consider the other two subjects.
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The nature and extent of the mismatches in perceptions and understanding 
between Europe and the GCC vary, depending not least on whether one 
considers the official or the popular view, and this is made more complicated 
still by the fact that there are not one but several such views, depending on the 
precise constituency concerned. This is true in Europe  as much as it is in GCC – 
but we focus here on the latter.  European interlocutors in such dialogues need to 
be aware of these nuances and linkages. 
 
What this means in policy terms, is the need  
•  to address issues of governance and human rights in the context of 
cultural understanding (which is emphatically not the same as ‘cultural 
relativism’);   
•  to demonstrate European efforts to foster such understanding in Europe, 
and a willingness also to address possible European failings in the 
dialogue;  
•  to show a genuine commitment to a solution of the Palestine question, 
including censure of Israel where relevant. 
 
The latter point is not invalidated by the observation that the governing elites are 
less ‘driven’ by commitment to the Palestine cause, than by pragmatic raison  
d’état.
2 First, there are very few among them (and those probably mainly in 
Kuwait) who do not feel some personal connection to the fate of Jerusalem and 
the Palestinians; second, their raison d’état, and raison de régime, tells them 
that they cannot afford to ignore the often far stronger feelings on the subject 
among their populations: the issue, after all, links in to several of the pillars on 
which these regimes have built their legitimacy. A recent clear indication of the 
importance attached to the Palestinian dimension in relations with Europe and 
the rest of the world, were the interviews given to Der Spiegel and the Financial 
Times by Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia in June 2001.
3 
 
Moreover,  by definition, attempts to address issues of GGHR must, if 
they are to lead anywhere, find acceptance among the populations at large.   
Unless the three bullet points above are observed, such attempts are likely to be 
tainted as hypocritical or worse, in popular perceptions outside small groups of 
westernised intellectuals. 
 
NUANCES  WITHIN  THE  GCC 
 
Differences within the GCC exist between states, between rulers and ruled, and 
among the ruled themselves, not only over Palestine, but also over relations with 
Europe and the West in general, and over the question of domestic political 
arrangements and conventions. Ruling, highly educated, and cosmopolitan elites 
are by and large very positive towards relations with the West, of which they 
form in some ways a part. The larger, less cosmopolitan sections of the 
population – including both the less privileged and the conservative bourgeoisie 
– are much more ambivalent, seeing the West as a potential source of 
corruption, domination, and the fount of support for Israel.  Attitudes to human 
rights – including for instance the rights of women, or the ways in which the 
Shari’a is applied – vary as well, even though the vast majority of the 
populations would bridle at any attempt to devalue the Shari’a itself as a central 
pillar underpinning these societies’ principles. Within those parameters, some 
among the cosmopolitan elites will be amenable to expanding women’s rights, 
and to a dialogue on other relevant issues. Indeed, the variation between the six 
states on such issues also demonstrates the variety of interpretation that is 
possible. Often, however, it is the more conservative population at large where 
resistance to the advance of such ideas is found. Again, though, popular views 
themselves vary between the six states as well as within them (social attitudes in 
Jeddah, for instance, differ markedly from those in the Saudi heartland of Najd). 
Politically, a chasm yawns between westernised liberals and Islamist 
conservatives, both on the subject of social rules and legislation, and that of 
political arrangements. Regimes therefore have to balance between these 
constituencies, as well as coping with the pressures from the outside world.  
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Yet it would be mistaken to conclude from this that “Human Rights is a 
Western concept” and that it is therefore futile or worse to attempt to impose 
them on these societies. Nor is it tenable to claim that “GCC countries are not 
interested in political representation.”  Let us deal with the latter issue first. 
 
THE ISSUE OF ‘DEMOCRATISATION’ OR POLITICAL 
PARTICIPATION 
 
Even the most vociferous Islamist critics of western democracy do nevertheless 
clamour for a say in how the country is run – or at least for the right to criticise 
those doing the running. That is as clear a sign of the demand for political 
participation as any. Here, differences of opinion are slightly differently 
distributed. Among the population at large, the smaller group of liberal 
intellectuals balance their desire for a formal system of political participation 
with that of containing conservative Islamists. The ruling family is often seen in 
this respect as a buffer. The ruling families themselves also show shades of 
opinion, ranging from old-style dynastic absolutism to constitutional monarchy 
with a democratic apparatus; the proponents of the latter, though, remain on the 
whole very cautious.
4  There are of course also striking differences from country 
to country: Kuwait remains the furthest advanced in the impact of its 
parliamentary politics, but Qatar and Bahrain’s fledgling and partial 
democratisation does (or will) include women, whereas Kuwait’s still does not.  
Oman remains a case of  benevolent, if flawed, despotism, but electoral 
experience is being developed (again including women) in the context of the 
consultative bodies;  moreover, it is said that Sultan Qaboos has devised a semi-
democratic set of principles for after his departure. Even in Saudi Arabia the 
debates in the fairly toothless Majlis al-Shura are often very forceful and 
informed,
5  and it appears that Crown Prince Abdullah, the de facto ruler, is 
minded to expand the input of non-royal voices into policy-making; he is also 
thought to favour expanding women’s roles in the economy, for instance.
6  
These fledgling signs of ‘pluralist’ awareness among the regimes derive at least 
in part from a recognition that there is a domestic demand for such a say, and 
that this can only increase in line with the relatively declining capability of the 
state to provide generous cradle-to-grave welfare and jobs. Opening up the 
decision-making process for non-royal actors, and expanding avenues for 
popular participation, can, moreover, also spread responsibility for difficult 
decisions or circumstances, or for government failures.   
 
None of this is to say that there is a groundswell of pent-up demand for 
radical change in the political systems running throughout the populations of 
these six states, waiting to explode. What there certainly is, however, varying in 
strength from country to country, is gradually growing forms of political 
awareness, criticism of governments, and desire to see some increase in 
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participation and government accountability. Perhaps the clearest examples so 
far have been in Bahrain and Kuwait. In Bahrain, the troubles experienced 
during much of the 1990s eventually forced a measure of political adaptation 
from 1999 onwards, bringing about a huge surge in popularity for the Emir and 
the Crown Prince when it became clear that a genuine break with the past was 
being made. Indeed, the speed and extent of the reforms pushed through by the 
Emir, less than two years after his succession, can be seen as a conscious 
attempt to establish a new political base for his rule, and partly neutralising 
challengers from within the ruling family. In Kuwait, the level of participation in 
the elections of 1999 – the first case of a new Kuwaiti assembly being elected 
within the constitutional limit following suspension of the previous assembly by 
the Emir – exceeded most analysts’ expectations, and the usual mass summer 
emigration to escape the heat was postponed until the inauguration of the new 
Assembly in July.
7  In Saudi Arabia, the evidence comes from occasional 
disturbances or attacks, some violent,  whether among the Shi’ite population 
over issues of discrimination, or among opponents of the US presence in the 
country; and from a number of petitions to the King organised in the early 1990s 
by the liberal-intellectual as well as the religious establishment. There is a 
widespread concern among Saudi intellectuals with issues of governance 
(although, as indicated already, their democratic instincts may be tempered by 
fear of the Islamists).
8  
 
Demand has been less obvious but by no means absent in Oman, the UAE 
and Qatar. In Oman, there was considerable competition in the September 2000 
elections for the Majlis al-Shura (under new rules which for the first time 
involved direct election). In the UAE, there has long been an unorganised 
movement among the intelligentsia arguing for greater political participation 
(and for instance for direct election of representatives to the Federal National 
Council); occasionally voices among some of the ruling families, especially in 
Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah, have sympathised with this aim. In Qatar there is 
very limited history of organised opposition, but when the Emir allowed free 
municipal elections in March 1999, participation was intense. In this Emirate, 
the small population and future gas riches meant the Emir could be assumed to 
be under less pressure than elsewhere to open up the system. That he did so 
nevertheless, in quite striking fashion, a few years after ousting his father as 
ruler, indicates his appreciation that there was indeed a demand to be tapped 
into, not least among the educated younger generation staffing much of the 
private and public sector, including the armed forces. As in the case of his 
namesake, Sheikh Hamad of Bahrain, it served to buttress his power base 
against potential challengers within the regime.
9  
 
Nevertheless, at least in Saudi Arabia and the UAE the regimes’ position 
remains that “democracy does not suit the local culture”. Sometimes the 
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adjectives ‘Islamic’ or ‘Arabian’ are added to characterise that ‘culture.’ And 
this reasoning has by no means fully disappeared among the ruling groups in the 
other GCC states.
10 Yet the above should already have made clear that, whatever 
label one uses, the demand for increased political participation and some 
government accountability is not at all alien to these populations – even if some 
may wish to fill it in in starkly different ways. Nor is there anything in ‘Islam’ 
(itself a huge and plural category) that necessarily contradicts the basic 
principles of pluralist, participatory politics.
11 ‘Culture’ and ‘traditions’ in any 
case are never static, nor uniform: it is often precisely failure to adapt that kills 
them. 
 
If there is a local demand, and if there is nothing inevitably and 
intrinsically opposed to it in local culture, then the aim of increasingly 
participatory politics is one that the European actors can sensibly pursue. Are 
there any positive reasons to do so, however? As was already hinted at earlier, 
there are indeed. Quite apart from the fact that the fostering of GGHR is part of 
the very principles on which the EU itself, and its CFSP, are meant to be built, 
and therefore from the arguments of moral force and consistency,
12  there are 
good practical reasons to encourage political development in the GCC. First, too 
glaring a contrast in the treatment of the GCC states on the one hand, and the 
rest of the developing world on the other, lays the EU open to double standards, 
and diminishes its credibility elsewhere – indeed possibly even within its own 
future expanded borders. Having publicly adopted the goals it has, and having 
pressed them on a number of countries – not least some in the Middle East and 
North Africa – the EU does not have the option of cancelling them when it 
comes to the GCC states. But the reasons relating to the GCC itself are just as 
powerful. 
 
THE  NEED  FOR  POLITICAL  EVOLUTION  
 
These reasons are in essence to do with the long-term stability of these states – a 
key interest of the EU. More precisely, gradual evolution towards greater 
political participation, transparency and accountability is inevitable if the 
economic reforms are to be enabled that will be necessary to cope with the 
pressures of globalisation and a growing population. At the same time, a modest 
further relative decline in state resources will enhance both this need for 
economic transformation and the likelihood of direct demands for political 
adaptation. 
 
The social contract in the days of plenty – from the 1970s to the mid-
1980s – was different from that of most other states: the state provided, did not 
tax, and demanded little of its subjects. By and large, the latter acquiesced in a 
system where, as long as government policy maintained this rentier 
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arrangement, and did not act against key values (e.g. traditional local 
interpretations of Islam), they had more to lose than to gain from upheaval. This 
was further facilitated by a traditional set of values and mechanisms assuring a 
sense that rulers by and large acted in accordance with the values and interests 
of the population.  
 
Four key sets of changes intervened to upset this equation, and will continue 
to do so: 
•  the evolution of oil prices and markets; 
•  globalising pressures in the world economy; 
•  the population explosion;  
•  social change. 
 
Population and youth explosion 
 
The drastically reduced GNP per capita of Saudi Arabia, since the mid-1980s, to 
less than $7000 in 1999, is an illustration of the shift that has already happened. 
Only the UAE and Qatar, among the GCC states, now feature among the 
world’s richest states (with $17,000 and $21,000 respectively).
13 This slide has 
been a consequence both of lower oil prices – which I shall turn to below – and 
the high population growth that is typical for the GCC states. At annual growth 
rates of well over 3 per cent, the population will at least double by 2020.  
 
Taking the most populous country as an example, Saudi Arabia’s 
population has already undergone a huge change in size and composition, as its 
infant mortality dropped and life expectancy rose to developed world levels. The 
country’s population, which doubled in just 15 years (1980-1995), can in 2000 
be estimated at around 22 million, although only about 15 million are native 
Saudis: the remainder are foreign workers and their dependants. Yet is not just 
absolute growth figures that matter. Well over 40 % of the population was 
younger than 15 in 2000,  and over 60 % was 25 or younger. These figures rise 
still higher if the foreign population is excluded. Saudi estimates have the native 
population under 15 at over 46 % of the total. This has two obvious 
implications: a continuation of the high rate of population growth even if the 
birth rate drops (Saudi Arabia’s demographic momentum ratio is one of the 
highest in the world), and a coming need for employment proportionately even 
larger than today.  There have been suggestions that the rate of annual 
population growth may have begun to drop, and official Saudi projections have 
it fall  to 2.6 % by 2005. But this seems unduly optimistic, and is not supported 
by the available evidence and trends so far. As of 2000 the rate was still around 
3.5 % (and even higher according to some estimates). Growth will eventually 
slow, but it is, according to US Census Bureau estimates, likely to remain above 
3 per cent until 2020, falling to 2.6 % only in 2020-30.
14 Not only will the GCC 
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population expand rapidly, therefore, but the youth explosion will exacerbate the 
effect on the demand for jobs, services and welfare in the medium and long 
term.  
 
Oil markets and prices 
 
The era of the oil boom came to an end with the collapse of oil prices in 1986, 
when they dipped below $10 per barrel. Subsequently there have been 
occasional spikes, but by 1998 they had again fallen to the same level. Since 
then, OPEC production discipline in aiming at a price band of $22-28 per barrel 
has been successful in pushing prices up again, but there is no prospect of their 
rising again to the levels reached prior to 1986 – except for occasional crises in 
the politics of the region. In real terms, of course, the drop in the value of oil 
revenues has been even more pronounced.  No precise predictions about the oil 
market can be made with any confidence, but there is a broad consensus that 
prices, by 2020,  are unlikely to be much above $22 per barrel in 2001 dollars.
 15  
 
Against this stands the likely changing composition of oil supply to the 
world’s markets. By 2020, OPEC’s share is expected to rise again to about 50 
per cent of world supply, from some 40 per cent today. OPEC output in absolute 
terms is likely to double to some 60 million barrels per day (mbd). The largest 
share of this production expansion will be from the Gulf. Saudi Arabia, which 
clearly has the largest capacity to expand production, is likely to double its 
exports by 2020.
16 Kuwait and the UAE are also thought to be able to double 
their oil production capacity by 2020. This will necessitate major investment in 
exploration and development. Production costs in the Gulf are less than $1.50 
per barrel,  and the investment needed to expand production by 1 barrel per day 
is estimated as less than $5000. This means that, even at conservative price 
projections, total development and operating costs over the period to 2020 will 
amount to no more than 20 per cent of revenues. On these assumptions, net oil 
revenues for Saudi Arabia would fall behind population growth by about 20 per 
cent at most, taking account also increased domestic consumption. This shortfall 
would of course turn out smaller if actual production expansion exceeds this 
expectation.   
 
In any case, even in the cases of these three countries, resources relative 
to population are likely to fall somewhat further. In those other GCC states 
where expansion capacity is smaller this picture is correspondingly bleaker. In 
Bahrain, indeed, reserves are almost exhausted, and Oman and Qatar are thought 
to have little room for capacity expansion. Against this, of course, increased gas 
production may provide relief. Yet that will itself require major investment. 
Only in Qatar does the financial future in this respect look distinctly rosy, with 
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the already well-advanced development of its huge gas reserves, set against its 
tiny population.  
 
Overall, however, the picture remains one where the period of apparently 
unlimited riches, experienced in the period between 1974 and 1986, is 
definitively over. The stresses already experienced in GCC budgets in recent 
years will not disappear. They will, moreover, continue to be exacerbated by the 
sharp fluctuations in prices and revenues which have buffeted these economies 
since the mid-1980s, as long as their hydrocarbon dependence remains at current 
levels. 
 
Putting hydrocarbon revenues in context 
 
One might observe at this point that financial problems are only relative, since 
the budget balances only look tight because of huge defence outlays of up to 40 
per cent of revenues, and the large, usually unaccounted-for, slices of national 
revenue going  into the maintenance of the extensive and expanding royal 
families. Both observations are true in their own right. But a reallocation of 
resources in those fields will not be easy.  
 
The royal families, exemplified by the Al Saud, have been experiencing 
an annual growth rate at least as high as the population overall. Just the number 
of Saudi princes alone is estimated to double every 22 years; royal males under 
18 are already thought to be some 70% more numerous than those over that 
age.
17 Even a cutback in the royal subsidy regime – difficult enough to achieve – 
will still see outlays rise. Defence will remain a sensitive and important area, 
given the uncertainties in the regional environment,  not least because of the 
unresolved Iraqi dilemma. Weapons purchases may be slowly reduced, in line 
with the general squeeze on resources, but a drastic reallocation from defence to 
other areas seems unlikely. While it is true that much of the high-tech hardware 
being purchased is less than fully effectively deployed, part of the function of 
these purchases is as ‘insurance’, making it more likely that the supplying 
countries will come to the GCC states’ aid in a crisis. 
 
More important, perhaps, are the effects that the age structure and growth 
in population will have: as already indicated, the demand for new jobs will not 
merely rise in line with absolute population growth, but will be intensified by 
the large numbers of young people coming onto the labour market. In addition 
there are the concomitant strains on the education budget. Increasingly, also, the 
changing nature of society, education and exposure to global information may 
bring about a desire for ‘real’, useful employment. 
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The need for very significant extra investment in oil and gas development 
has already been referred to. Beyond this, maintenance, updating, and expansion 
of infrastructure and utilities to cope with the growing population and increased 
urbanisation will also require huge investments, which are likely to run to at 
least $300 billion over the period 2000-20.
18  
 
In short, even the expected expansion in hydrocarbons production, 
especially given increased domestic consumption, will not avoid a squeeze on 
resources. Yet there is another, straightforward indication of the limitation of oil 
revenues as an economic pillar.  Taking the quarter century from 1970, World 
Bank data show an average decline in Saudi Arabia’s GDP per capita of nearly 3 
% in real terms, notwithstanding the double oil boom of the mid- and late 1970s.  
Of course, the choice of beginning and end of such a reference period may 
distort the picture. But even over the price recovery period of 1998-2000, GDP 
per capita on average rose very little, passing the  $7000 mark again in 2000. As 
a reflection of a period of sharp rises in oil prices that is hardly impressive, 
especially when the nominal figures are turned into real growth rates. GDP 
growth for 2001-2003 is forecast at well below 3 %, meaning a further decline 
in GDP per capita.
19  In sum, the expected level of future economic growth will 




‘Globalisation’ is affecting the GCC states’ socio-political and economic model 
in two ways: one is directly economic, the other a matter of ideas. The domestic 
need to cope with the economic pressures and requirements analysed earlier, is 
in itself already a major reason for economic reform. But the ever more 
explicitly global rules of the international economy are now, additionally, 
making it much harder to escape the disciplines of the international market even 
if Gulf leaders wanted to. For countries so dependent on world trade, opting out 
of the WTO, or, at a smaller scale, foregoing free trade arrangements with, for 
instance, the EU, is no longer considered a realistic option. To the contrary, the 
economic and – just as importantly – political advantages to be had by joining 
such frameworks have come to be seen as outweighing the economic fears and 
drawbacks, at least as long as the right temporary concessionary conditions can 
be negotiated. Internal and external factors intertwine, therefore, to build 
inexorable pressure for liberalising and otherwise reforming the economy, 
including by reducing subsidies and bringing external competition. As indicated 
below, however, genuine reforms of that nature, however necessary for domestic 
economic reasons, will inevitably, eventually, bring further pressures for 
improved political participation.  
 
  11 
Those pressures can only be added to by the second face of globalisation, 
viz. the increased permeability of Saudi society to political ideas from around 
the world:  not just ‘democratic’ ideals but a whole range of ideologies and 
approaches which, ‘democratic’ or not, may imply an increased  tendency to 
question existing arrangements. Information technology also has the effect of 
making information and debate about domestic affairs much more readily 
available – even if it has to be routed through external channels.  
  
Tentative moves towards economic and political reform show that some 
among the GCC leaderships have realised the pre-2000 model is unlikely to be a 
sustainable arrangement.  
 
Dealing with the ‘problem’ 
 
There are only three means to deal with the combination of pressures generated 
by these changes: economic reform; political liberalisation; and the use of 
traditional legitimising tools. The argument here is that a combination of all 
three will be required: the first two are interlinked; traditional sources of 
legitimacy on their own will no longer be sufficient; and the only alternative 
beyond all this, increased repression, has been shown by the case of pre-2000 
Bahrain to be neither viable nor necessary as a long-term route. 
 
The first means comes down to economic diversification and the creation 
of a more internationally competitive economy. All governments in the GCC 
have been making some gestures in this direction. But this eventually implies a 
drastic scaling back of the entitlement economy to which the population has 
become used – with the introduction of taxation, real jobs, realistic wages, a 
reduction in foreign labour, and fewer subsidies for utilities and uneconomic 
jobs. In other words, some significant measure of pain and adjustment for most 
sectors of the population becomes inevitable. This creates further pressures for 
the second means, viz. political liberalisation: there is no reason at all why the 
maxim “no taxation without representation”  should somehow be peculiarly 
inapplicable in the GCC. But in addition, the government may wish to bring in 
others to share the responsibility and, perhaps, the blame. The third possible 
means of shoring up the legitimacy that is inevitably being undermined by the 
impact of economic liberalisation,
20 is increased use of legitimising themes of 
tradition and ideology – be it Islam or the Palestine issue (socialism being quite 
distinctly out). Tradition, at least, is of decreasing potence in its own right, 
because of changing social and popular attitudes that come with a changing 
society,  but also because ‘traditional’ themes can no longer easily be 
dissociated from performance on other indicators. 
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Traditional mechanisms and sources of legitimacy 
 
It is true that there were, and to some extent still are, traditional forms of contact 
between rulers and ruled, which arguably were long a  workable way of making 
sure grievances were heard and acted upon or pre-empted. Together with the 
comfortable demands-resources ratio, this made serious revolt unlikely. In the 
earlier situation – until the early 1980s – demands from groups outside the 
ruling elites for a say in the running of the country were (a) limited, and (b) 
fairly successfully channelled in traditional ways using traditional mechanisms. 
A changing environment is affecting this directly. The downward turn in the 
balance between resources and demands since 1986 is only one part of this 
equation. The other is that society, economy and polity have become more 
complex (as well as larger), especially because of the advent of oil wealth and 
all the changes that this has brought about, including fast and far-reaching 
urbanisation, education, and the access to ideas and images that has come with  
information technology. 
 
Traditional channels for information flows and interaction between 
regime and society, functioning acceptably until the 1960s, have gradually 
become less able to cope effectively. Large, highly bureaucratised, 
technologically advanced economies and societies are far less amenable to 
management through personal access via the royal majlis, to take but one 
example. Such channels therefore inevitably have been losing some of their 
legitimacy as a way for society to express grievances and get access to those in 
power. 
 
It is true also that these regimes have, to varying extents, been successful 
at employing other sources of legitimacy, including long-established traditional 
means. But these, too, are often coming under pressure. 
 




•  personal charisma of the leader; 
•  tradition, and the maintenance by the regime of traditional values in 
government and society; 
•  patronage,  and the ability to deliver improvements in the quality of 
life; 
•  behaviour and government appropriate for Muslim rulers 
(especially important in Saudi Arabia); and 
•  effectiveness of the rulers in dealing with the outside world: this 
was already so in pre-modern times: much of the role of the senior 
sheikhs or ‘rulers’ was concerned with this task. 
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Today, and into the next two decades, serious question marks arise over each of 
these factors – although again there is a good deal of variation between the 
individual states. Let us briefly look at each factor in turn. 
 
(1) Several of the Gulf states have been blessed with particularly 
charismatic leaders. Obvious examples are Kings Abdulaziz and Faisal in Saudi 
Arabia, and Sheikh Zayed of Abu Dhabi – not only effective leaders but 
respected as such, as well as for their perceived personal qualities. In Oman, 
Sultan Qaboos has proved an astute and independent-minded ruler, and 
managed, from being virtually unknown, to acquire a good deal of personal 
respect during his years in power. Saudi Arabia’s current King, Fahd, was 
perceived as a strong personality and effective manager during his long years as 
a crown prince and the first decade or so of his reign, but thereafter appeared to 
become less forceful as he increasingly suffered from ill health. In Bahrain, 
Sheikh Isa retained a good deal of affection until his death in 1999, 
notwithstanding the eruptions of political violence: he retained the image of a 
well-meaning, affable father-figure, while much of the most direct criticism was 
directed at his brother Sheikh Khalifa, the Prime Minister.   
 
Considering the six states today, the picture is far from even. Kuwait’s 
Emir is respected but frail and not always seen as very decisive. The crown 
prince and Prime Minister, Sheikh Saad, has suffered a rather bad press. In the 
United Arab Emirates, Sheikh Zayed’s passing (he is now in his 80s) will leave 
the federation without anyone of similar stature: the heir apparent, Sheikh 
Khalifa, is seen as possessing neither the capabilities nor the strength of 
character of his father – even if in recent years his image has recovered 
somewhat. This may be problematic for Abu Dhabi, but possibly even more so 
for the cohesion and management of the UAE as a whole (where the most 
forceful figure will be found in Dubai, in the person of the crown prince Sheikh 
Mohammed Al-Maktum). In Saudi Arabia, the fact that King Fahd is virtually 
incapacitated is in itself troublesome, as is the constant flow of rumour and 
criticism (justified or otherwise) of a number of other princes – most 
prominently Prince Sultan, who is next in line for the throne after Crown Prince 
Abdullah – for greed, corruption, lack of nationalism and, on occasion, un-
Islamic behaviour. Here, though, the Crown Prince is an excellent 
counterweight: in terms of reputation and his alleged policy preferences, he is 
among the most respected of the senior princes. As for Oman, the problem is not 
so much Sultan Qaboos himself, as the fact that there is no heir, nor an obvious 
successor. At the same time, the Sultan no longer enjoys the reputation of 
accessibility which his ‘meet the people’ tours used to engender; he is 
increasingly viewed as isolated by the small power elite surrounding him. In 
Bahrain and Qatar, finally, the new Emirs are still consolidating their position 
and, being young and having only fairly recently assumed power, cannot rely on 
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the power of their inevitably still limited charisma  (it is interesting to note that 
it is they who have opted for a ‘democratic’ departure of sorts: indeed, as argued 
above, the speed of the Bahraini reforms, once they came, may in part be 
explained as a successful grab for popular support by the new Emir).
22 
 
(2) Tradition, and the maintenance by the regime of traditional values in 
society and government, are also vulnerable as a means to safeguard legitimacy. 
The changing world of technology and economics at times necessitate 
government policies that appear to run counter to tradition. Such changes also 
inevitably mean that society itself changes, along with the driving forces of 
social interaction and politics; hence, so do popular values, expectations and 
demands. 
 
(3) Patronage and the ability to deliver improvements in the quality of life 
– an essential part of regime strategies from their very origin – runs up directly 
against the relative shrinking of resources. This is especially problematic given 
the youth explosion and the very high expectations which several decades of 
state generosity have created. 
 
(4) In all six of these states ‘Islamic’ legitimacy is important: both 
personally and in their policies, rulers need to be seen as ‘good Muslims’. This 
is, of course, especially crucial in Saudi Arabia, whose regime derives its claim 
to power from the role of the Al-Saud as protector of the Holy Places and of 
Islamic values. Anything which affects their reputation in this regard is therefore 
potentially destabilising. This need not mean strict adherence to particular 
‘conservative’ interpretations (the variations between Kuwait, Qatar, Oman and 
Saudi Arabia are testimony to that), but any behaviour or policy that is perceived 
as improper by a significant section of the population, has the power to 
undermine legitimacy. It should be noted, though, that – unless the transgression 
is truly egregious – such criticism generally is less of an issue when 
performance under the other four factors of legitimacy is satisfactory. In other 
words: the worse the performance on the other four, the more importance this 
factor will acquire. 
 
(5) The traditional expectation that the ruler should be able to deal 
effectively with the outside world could, and still can, rebound on him. Securing 
the polity against external threat, making the necessary deals with outside 
powers, and safeguarding trade and commerce have always been crucial parts of 
this task. In such dealing with the outside world, the ruler in effect also 
performed the function of ‘buffer’ between that world and the domestic society. 
Perceived failure in each of these functions will reflect badly on the ruler’s (or 
the regime’s) legitimacy. The Gulf regimes have always needed to balance the 
need for foreign protection, for instance, with avoiding being seen as mere 
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servants of those protectors, or as allowing them undue interference in local 
society.  Instances of criticism on these grounds are the question of policy on 
Palestine versus dependence on Israel’s protector, the USA; and the 1990-91 
Gulf War, during which the Al-Saud in particular were accused by some of 
over-reliance on Western protection and bringing in socially disruptive foreign 





Difficulties in a single one of these five factors can usually be absorbed by 
performance on the others; by the same token, the greater weaknesses there are 
across different factors, the more of a potential threat to regime stability each 
one becomes. At the start of the 21
st century, performance on any of the five 
cannot be taken for granted – indeed there are problems with several for all six 
regimes. If one combines this finding with the basic demands/resources equation 
outlined earlier, a two-fold conclusion is inescapable: 
 
•  grievances and complaints about both material and other aspects of life and 
government will increase (not least when the expansion of taxes becomes 
necessary); 
•  popular demands for a say in how the country is run will increase. 
 
The first of these trends, as experience from history and other parts of the world 
shows, almost always leads to the second – and the two are usually expressed 
together. Of course, the timing and precise form will vary strongly between the 
six states. Problems are probably furthest away for Qatar and the UAE, given 
their better resources-demands ratio. But the most telling illustration of the 
phenomenon has been seen during the 1990s in the one state where the 
resources/demands equation has slipped furthest first: Bahrain.
23  I t  i s  n o t  
coincidental that it is in Bahrain that the most recent experiment in political 
adaptation has got underway since late 1999. 
 
HUMAN  RIGHTS 
 
For European governments and the EU, then, it makes perfect sense – indeed it 
is imperative – to encourage such adaptation. Other human rights questions 
should be seen in this context. There can be no question that, even apart from 
the right peacefully to change one’s government, the human rights situation in 
these countries is far from ideal, as is shown in the various country reports by 
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the US State Department.
24 
The strongest criticisms have been justifiably aimed at Saudi Arabia and 
Bahrain, although in the latter the situation in 2000-01 has improved 
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dramatically. Freedoms are clearly most constricted,  and abuses most frequent, 
in Saudi Arabia. Yet it is important to put this observation in perspective:  even 
the situation in Saudi Arabia does not come anywhere near that of egregious 
cases such as North Korea, Iraq, China, Myanmar, or a number of African states. 
Indeed, for the majority of the population the Saudi regime has been a 
benevolent autocracy – or perhaps more accurately, benevolent if autocratic 
family rule, implemented in ways that chime with local expectations. Moreover, 
many of the problems criticised by outside reports stem in fact from 
conservative patriarchal social values rather than simply from government 
policy or abuse. Nevertheless, problems there are, and both as a matter of 
principle (and established EU policy) and for pragmatic reasons similar to those 
advanced with regard to political evolution, there is a strong case for addressing 
this area in the EU-GCC dialogue. 
 
Some issues, such as the existence of the death penalty,  would not be a 
fruitful area of action, since there is an almost unanimous consensus in favour, 
at least of the principle. A different matter is the way in which verdicts are 
reached. Again, it would be futile to expect abandonment of Shari’a courts in 
favour of secular western-style ones. For the vast majority of the population, 
Shari’a law and Shari’a courts are a natural and proper part of life as Muslims in 
a Muslim country. But there is certainly scope for amending the procedures of 
these courts: they differ, in any case, across the Islamic world. There is also 
considerable scope for improving the training of judges. There is, in fact, also 
significant room for interpretations of Islamic law that would bring practice 
much closer to established international human rights standards. Dialogue about 
the sources and nature of Islamic law, in a genuine two-way process, preferably 
also involving Muslim Europeans, could offer real scope for bringing forward 
ideas in that direction. Sources for such reinterpretation abound, both in the 
actual practices around the Islamic world, including the Gulf itself and the rest 
of the Middle East, and in the huge and rich body of Islamic thought over the 
centuries to this day.
25 Equally clearly, no-one enjoys being arbitrarily arrested, 
or tortured; these are issues on which there is no intrinsic clash of cultures.  The 
case of Bahrain’s protests in the 1990s is again instructive here.  
 
Women’s rights and their full involvement in the economy and public life, 
are issues being much discussed among local activists and intellectuals – even if 
there remains a reluctant conservative majority. Again, there is no ‘Islamic’ 
barrier here: some of the most effective arguments in favour have been put 
forward by female Muslim scholars.
26 Europe should not be shy of advocating 
basic principles in this regard. 
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The roots of the human rights infractions observed in the GCC states, 
then, have been four-fold: legal interpretation and practice, policing practice, 
social values, and political interests and calculation. But these categories cannot 
easily be separated. An awareness of the connections between these four is 
essential. Some abuses may arise from straightforwardly political roots (and thus 
link in to the debate on political adaptation); some may follow social constraints, 
and be reinforced by political fears of breaching those constraints; some, such as 
the striking and self-perpetuating preponderance in the Saudi judiciary of 
religious judges from the ultra-conservative region of Qasim, may have Islamic 
legal forms, and certainly have legal-practical consequences, but arise from 
political history and calculation.
27 Finally, much of the brutality and 
arbitrariness complained about by private GCC nationals as well as outside 
agencies, can be blamed on policing practice. Police officers are often ill-
trained, and not infrequently foreign, although there is much variation between 
the six states (with Saudi Arabia again coming off worst).
28 To label any of these 
features as either intrinsic to Islam, or forever hostage to local culture, is quite 
untenable. 
 
In all areas of governance and human rights, then, there are strong reasons 
of principle and practical interest for Europe to be engaged;  there are no 
insurmountable obstacles of a cultural nature;  but it is important that such 
engagement exhibit cultural understanding, and awareness of the evolving 
variations among the publics and regimes of the GCC. It is also crucial that it be 
seen to be married to words and action both in Europe’s own internal fostering 
of understanding of the Gulf, and on the Palestine issue. The worst possible 
signal, undermining the credibility of any initiatives on governance and human 
rights aimed at the GCC (or other Arab states, for that matter), are moves such 
as the EU abstention over the October 2000 resolution in the UN Human Rights 
Commission (Geneva) condemning Israel’s human rights record in the second 




There is no reason for the EU not to follow a similar pattern as with other third 
countries, i.e. to include GGHR as an “essential element” of EU external 
relations – both bilaterally and in new or amended EU-GCC agreements (such as 
on the occasion of the Free Trade Agreement being concluded, presumably in 
2005). This is not merely formalism, it also corresponds with the EU’s clearly 
enounced principles, recently reinforced in a number of communications and 
declarations on human rights and democratisation. As demonstrated by the case 
of the USSR under Helsinki, such agreed phrases can have effect beyond the 
signatories’ expectations.  In any case, the option of somehow excepting the 
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GCC states from what has become an explicitly announced basic principle for 
relations with all other countries, is neither practically not politically feasible. 
 
Nevertheless, the precise way in which the issues are approached, the 
instruments used, and the language that is used, should reflect the cultural 
understanding advocated earlier,  as well as an awareness that the situation in 
these countries compares reasonably well with many other LDCs. Finally, it 
must also be recognised that these states are in a category of their own in terms 
of wealth, economic and human development. Dialogue on these issues must 
therefore be constructed as explicitly between equals, and as going both ways. 
The May 2001 Communication from the Commission already lends support for 
this: “the dialogue [with third countries]… should be a two-way one, with the 
EU also agreeing to discuss human rights and democratisation issues within its 
own borders.”
29 But none of this means, indeed must not mean, that criticism 
and suggestions cannot be offered.  
 
In some contexts, the use of the terms ‘good governance’ and ‘sharing 
best practice’ is likely to be more effective in maintaining such dialogue, than 
unremitting advocacy of western-style ‘democracy’. But no excuse is necessary 
for including in a ‘dialogue of ideas’ the European principle of upholding human 
rights as defined in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. A simultaneous 
willingness to participate in, and listen to, Muslim-led debates on human rights 
in Islam, however, would be a prerequisite for finding a real audience. Bringing 
the discussion to that level, moreover, may eventually allow increased exposure 
of those voices within the GCC (and elsewhere in the Muslim world) which are 
already offering sophisticated interpretations of Islamic principles – 
interpretations that in many ways come quite close to the EU’s own basic 
principles.  Indeed, indirectly facilitating internal debate is likely to be at least as 
effective as any pressures to adopt Western models. Certainly, though, there is 
no reason why international agreements that have been ratified by these states 
themselves, cannot be used as points of reference. Indeed, in Saudi Arabia under 
Crown Prince Abdullah there has indeed already sprung up a fledgling 
discussion on human rights issues in 2000 and 2001, as the government acceded 
(with a reservation) to the UN Women’s Convention, and began to establish a 
number of institutions in the human rights field.
30  
 
One crucial way in which the case of the GCC differs from that of most 
other LDCs, is that there are no assistance programmes, nor the usual financial 
cooperation agreements to which political dialogue and especially dialogue on 
GGHR is usually attached. As a consequence, European states and the EU as a 
whole also do not, in the case of the GCC,  have the sort of leverage over 
governments that normally comes with this.  
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European initiatives must, in any case, also reach below the official level, 
addressing civil society directly (or, if you will, indirectly influencing 
government adaptation through fostering the development of civil society). This 
fits in with the point made earlier, on the value of facilitating internal debate. 
 
‘Decentralised cooperation,’ introduced in other relationships but also 
now part of the EU-GCC relationship, is an excellent example of indirect, civil 
society-oriented initiatives that can foster GGHR.  One particular initiative to 
illustrate this, the ‘University Cooperation’ part of the EU-GCC decentralised 
cooperation planned after 1995, also had the benefit of fulfilling some of the 
other conditions I referred to – but it was rather embarrassingly undone by 
bureaucratic difficulties inside the Commission and miscommunication between 
Brussels and a national (European) government – as well as within that 
government.
31 Similar initiatives deserve pursuing, both specifically aimed at 
GGHR issues and more indirect ones such as the universities project: the latter 
type may be more easily acceptable but nevertheless quite effective in the long 
run. 
 
Taking things beyond the current element of decentralised cooperation, by 
opening  collective agreements with the GCC to non-state actors, as in the recent 
Cotonou agreement with the ACP states,
32 would be a particularly worthwhile 
aim.  
 
The question of leverage is not the only constraint on European policy: 
there is a budget consideration too. GGHR initiatives or support cannot be 
funded from the main GGHR-related budget of the EU, because that is attached 
to assistance programmes. There is, though, the “European Initiative for 
Democracy and Human Rights” (EIDHR) that was started in 1994, and under 
which about €100 million has been available each year.
33 Whether funded from 
this or otherwise, there is clearly scope for some engagement in the GCC 
modelled on the kinds of initiatives pursued under that heading.  EIDHR’s brief 
is “to support human rights, democratisation and conflict prevention activities to 
be carried out primarily in partnership with NGOs and international 
organisations.”
34 Some 80 % of EIDHR commitments in 2000 indeed went to 
NGO activities, as well as some €6 million to UN and other international 
organisations.
35 The initiative annually determines a number of “thematic 
priorities”, and target groups, as well as “focus countries”. Again the absence of 
the GCC states as a region is striking – even though a very few planned NGO 
activities in 2000 did include Kuwait and Bahrain in a wider Arab framework. 
Projects are sponsored on the basis of bids in response to calls for proposals 
(either at the EU level, or locally), or as “targeted projects” that support policy 
objectives that cannot be covered that way. As the Commission itself observed, 
one of the initiative’s advantages is that it “can be used to take more political 
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The initiative’s first thematic priority is “support to strengthen 
democratisation, good governance and the rule of law”, mainly by working 
directly with civil society through NGOs. Part of this is “support for measures 
facilitating the peaceful democratic conciliation of group interests”: this, along 
with “training in the rule of law, and in particular human rights law,” is seen as 
important for another of the EU’s aims, viz. that of conflict prevention.
37 
Clearly, this theme is relevant for the case of the GCC states, and several of the 
activities undertaken under this theme elsewhere would be useful examples.
38 
The other current themes are (1) activities in support of the abolition of the death 
penalty; (2) support for the fight against torture and for international tribunals 
and criminal courts; and (3) combating racism, xenophobia and discrimination 
against minorities. The first of these is not a feasible priority target when it 
comes to the GCC states – even if the EU certainly should not shirk from 
proclaiming its own principles in this regard. The latter two, however, are areas 
where European attention could usefully be focused, and where some common 
interests or reciprocities with the GCC states can be identified as a basis for joint 
initiatives or, at the very least, widening agreement on the principles 
concerned.
39 In short, while there is not a strong case for making the GCC a 
group of ‘focus’ countries under EIDHR, they would certainly merit being 
officially brought into the remit of the initiative. EIDHR’s focus on working 
directly with civil society, largely through NGOs, but also through collaboration 
with UN and other international agencies, makes it particularly well suited to 
addressing many of the issues identified in the GCC states. 
 
The main leverage that European actors do have over the GCC 
governments is likely to lie in the latter’s interest in trade and investment 
relations with the countries of the EU. This includes, of course, the proposed 
Free Trade Agreement (aimed for by 2005),  and generally the GCC’s need for 
access to EU markets. To be successfully deployed, however, this instrument 
depends on the EU’s demonstrating that there is indeed a genuine willingness to 
open European markets. This resembles a similar problem in the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership Initiative (especially as regards agriculture): unless 
such opening-up is forthcoming, both incentive and credibility shrink 
significantly. Available sanctions are also fewer in number than in the case of 
aid recipients. They would have to centre around market access.  This should be 
thought of, if at all, as a pre-emptive element that could be built into trade and 
cooperation agreements in advance, but in future could be problematic in view 
of WTO rules.  In addition, of course, there is always the possibility of 
withholding other sorts of cooperation, or of causing political embarrassment.  
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But such pressures need not be the only incentive for development. First, 
as already indicated, common interests and reciprocities can be identified and 
expanded, and joint initiatives developed which, even if indirectly and over 
time, help bring the GGHR aims closer.  
 
Secondly, there is a perfectly good case to be made based on the long-
term political self-interest of the regimes: adaptation to changing social, 
technological and economic circumstances is essential if stability is to be 
assured. Such adaptation will need to be both political and economic – with the 
latter also translating into further need for the former. Persuasion, then, is at 
least as important as pressure. In this respect ‘quiet diplomacy’, probably better 
conducted by representatives of individual states, is of central importance. This 
is also an example of an area where individual countries’ experience and 
contacts with particular GCC regimes can be more useful than collective 
approaches (the UK’s long relationship with the Gulf comes to mind).  In such 
efforts of persuasion, it is increasingly possible to use the examples of Kuwait, 
Bahrain and Qatar to encourage the others, or to counter fears of upheaval. 
Indeed, in the case of Bahrain’s recent evolution, such persuasion has no doubt 
been of some importance. 
 
One key principle, then, is not to think simply in terms of the EU: think 
bilateral where bilateral can work best – e.g. where one state has experience or 
special access. The answer to the question: “bilateral or collective?” must be 
“both”, and this at both ends: bloc-to-bloc initiatives should be combined with 
bloc-to-state ones, as well as with state-to-state approaches.  This makes it all 
the more crucial that, in Europe, communication between EU organs and 
national governments is improved at the levels where it is relevant, to make sure 
that Brussels and the national governments know what each is doing, but 
especially to make sure that agreed EU strategies are actually known and acted 
upon by national governments and their bureaucracies. 
 
Suggestions for specific initiatives 
 
Some specific areas in which European initiatives could bear fruit in the above 
context, would include the following: 
 
•  Work towards the inclusion of a Cotonou-style stipulation in future EU-
GCC agreements, according to which civil society is formally given an 
enhanced role.
40 
•  Including some GCC initiatives among EIDHR’s portfolio – or at least 
pursue similar projects, both through NGOs and in collaboration with UN 
and international agencies. 
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•  Generally support dialogue initiatives run by NGOs, including 
universities. 
•  Explore the feasibility of an EU-GCC ‘jamboree’ where all relevant 
European, GCC and international NGOs would come together.  
•  Enhancing exchanges of visits by parliamentarians, and the development 
of parliamentary networks and seminars/working groups. 
•  Cultural / educational  exchange and seminars aimed at the new 
generation. Good bilateral examples have been the FCO/Sandhurst 
conference, in 1999, on The Gulf: Challenges and Opportunities for the New 
Generation;  and the involvement of one British university in the education 
and training of the Qatari Crown Prince.
41 An idea worth pursuing would be 
the development of a network for ‘young leaders’ from the EU and the GCC, 
or the inclusion of the GCC a wider EU-Middle East young leaders’ 
network.
42 
•  Projects to stimulate in the GCC the study of politics as a discipline, 
including through curriculum development collaboration and  exchange of 
teaching and research staff. 
•  Sponsoring of research on European politics in general and the EU in 
particular, among Gulf academics and research students. One means would 
be the stimulation of joint research projects. 
•  Working towards the establishment of European Studies Centres in Gulf 
universities, together with a demonstration that the expansion of Gulf studies 
in Europe is seen as important. The aborted EU-GCC University Cooperation 
project offers a useful model – indeed should be relaunched in some form. 
•  Offer to share European experience with those – especially governments – 
engaged in discussing, designing or implementing electoral principles or 
procedures, and constitutional reform. Where this proves acceptable, NGOs 
such as Transparency International – already supported under EIDHR 
elsewhere – could be associated with such work, for instance through running 
workshops. 
•  Collaboration in judicial training and penal reform (using experts with 
knowledge of Islam & preferably Arabic); this could include professional 
training for lawyers in the courts (whether already in place or aspiring);   
training in international law; and training in human rights law. One of the 
forms this could take would be joint legal seminars on human rights – as in 
one EIDHR-supported initiative between the EU and China. There is also a 
precedent in the Arab world for EIDHR support for a penal reform initiative, 
in the work of the NGO Penal Reform International in North Africa.
 43 
•  Support activities to educate/train military and police personnel in human 
rights issues and in civil-military and community-police relations; it is 
important that this be pursued under the joint auspices of EU and GCC 
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governments, and indeed could include personnel from EU or applicant 
countries. 
•  Expansion of, and adding a Gulf focus to, the kinds of human rights-
related projects already being undertaken in the Arab world with EIDHR 
support. Particularly interesting examples are the project of the Fédération 
Internationale des Droits de l’Homme “to develop constructive relations 
between human rights organisations and local authorities, and to strengthen 
synergies between the various local organisations in the Mediterranean 
region”;  and an extensive regional project by the Arab Institute for Human 
Rights “to strengthen the capacities of human rights NGOs and the role of the 
media in human rights”, (which also “aims to encourage the introduction of 
human rights into the teaching programmes of Ministries of Education and to 
develop training activities on the protection of women’s and children’s 
rights”).
44 
•  Support for initiatives aimed at the media, including the development of 
networks for journalists from both regions,  and professional journalism 
training.  
•  Collaboration in women’s professional educational programmes. 
•  Support for local/Arab/Muslim NGO activities aimed at women’s issues. 
Some examples for the Arab world are already included within EIDHR.
45 
•  Collaborate with, and support, the relevant international bodies, as well as 
relevant international NGOs such as, in particular, Amnesty International and 
Human Rights Watch: generic support of this nature can help achieve results 
without tying the EU directly to particular public criticisms of particular 




It is conceivable that general principles can be built into agreements, phrased 
carefully to avoid accusations of Western cultural bias (in the agreement with 
the ACP states, for instance, the term “democratic principles” is used instead of 
“democracy”). This can (rightly) be presented as implementing the same policy 
as with all other third country agreements since 1992, where respect for human 
rights and democracy are described as “essential elements” of the EU’s 
relationships. These principles in turn can help nudge the evolution in the field 
of good governance and human rights forward, even if not always in ways 
foreseen by the regimes.  Once agreed, they are there to be referred to by non-
governmental actors as well.   
 
Although the EU side in any EU-GCC dialogue should not hide its 
principles and convictions under a bushel, a gradual strategy, using persuasion 
and a variety of direct and indirect initiatives aimed at, with, or through civil 
society, is likely to be more effective and indeed more appropriate than direct 
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attempts to impose European-style change wholesale – also because only thus 
can local populations end up owning the changes. Contrary to cases such as 
Iraq’s, moreover, such gradualism is acceptable because of the relatively benign 
human rights environment in the GCC. As the May 2001 Communication from 
the Commission already pointed out, flexibility and country-specific criteria and 
assessment are of the essence,  although mechanistic use of indicators should be 
avoided, in favour of context-aware assessment of trends. 
 
All of this must be encapsulated in an approach that is seen to be 
culturally sensitive as well as two-way and, wherever possible, pursued jointly. 
No less important, it should be accompanied by European gestures on the 
international stage that make it easier for both populations and regimes to 
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